Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

Nina Doreen Davis Boyce v. Milan Mack Boyce :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
David S. Dolowitz; Jed W. Shields; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent;
R. M. Child; Donovan C. Snyder; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Boyce v. Boyce, No. 16342 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1660

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I N T HE
0 F

T HE

S U P R E ME
S T AT E 0 F

NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MILAN MACK BOYCE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

C0 UR T
UTA H

No. 1 6 3 4 2

Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

CHILD
DONOVAN C. SNYDER
Bayle, Child, & Ritchie
1105 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

R. M.

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

JED W. SHIELDS
243 East Fourth South
Suite 300, Upper Level
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent

FILED
f,UG

8 1979

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N T HE
0 F

T HE

S U P R E ME
S T A T E

NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

C 0 UR T

0 F

UT A H

)
)
)
)

)

vs.

)
)
)

MILAN MACK BOYCE,

No. 1 6 3 4 2

)
)

____________________________ )
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

CHILD
DONOVAN C. SNYDER
Bayle, Child, & Ritchie
1105 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

R. M.

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

JED W. SHIELDS
243 East Fourth South
Suite 300, Upper Level
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

2

ARGUMENT:
I.

II.

NO FRAUD WAS PERPETRATED ON THE
APPELLANT BY THE RESPONDENT AND
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FULL
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE SUCH AVERMENTS AND FAILED TO DO SO
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO APPELLANT TO REMOVE THE LIS PENDENS IS
A MOOT ISSUE UPON APPEAL

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

20

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED

U.S. Supreme Court:
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
429 (1962) .
. . . . . .

21

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971)

21

Supreme Court of Utah:
Haner v. Haner, 13 U. 2d 299, 373 P. 2d
577 (1962) . . .
. . . . .

9. 10.
11, 14

Richins v. Struhs, 17 U. 2d 356, 412 P. 2d
314 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416,
26C F. 2d 741 (1953) . . . .

8, 9

Other Authorities:
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
MILAN MACK BOYCE,

No. 16342

)

___________________________ )
Defendant-Respondent.

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third
District Court denying Appellant's Motion to set aside the
Decree of Divorce entered after the Court reviewed and accepted the settlement agreement of the parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, the Honorable David B. Dee
presiding, after hearing the motion of the Appellant submitted
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the U.R.C.P. to set aside the Decree
of Divorce which he had made and entered after reviewing and
accepting the stipulation of the parties, denied said motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and ordered Appellant to remove a Notice of Lis Pendens she had
filed against property awarded to Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation by this Court of the Order
of the District Court entered January 31, 1979.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the Appellant submitted argument in place of a
statement of facts, the Respondent hereby submits the following
as the statement of facts in this case.
On May 27, 1977, the Appellant, Nina Doreen Davis
Boyce, filed a C:omrlaint for divorce against the Respondent,
Milan Mack Boyce (R.

2).

As part of her action, Appellant had th

Court issue an Order requiring Respondent to make a full accounti
of his assets on July 27, 1977 (R. 10).
On August l, 1977, Respondent filed an Answer to
Appellant's Complaint (R. 7).

A hearing was thereafter set for

September 27, 1977 to consider the matters requiring resolution
pending final judgment.

At the September 27 hearing before Judge

David K. Winder, the Respondent testified that he owned a small
interest in Insul-Guard Corporation; that he was paid a salary b.,
Insul-Guard Corporation and had been paid a salary by

Insul-Do~
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Corporation; that he was the president of Insul-Guard; that he
had insurance benefits coming in from his efforts as an insurance
agent; that he owned real property at 8457 Top of the World
Drive, and at 1295 East 4800 South; that he owned ten 10 1/2 acre
lots of Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision which he estimated was worth
in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00);
that Insulation Corporation of America, Insul-Down, and InsulGuard owned several pieces of realty which he itemized in his
testimony; and he testified regarding the balance of his checking
accounts and other miscellaneous items of property (transcript of
hearing of September 27, 1977).

As a result of this hearing,

Respondent was ordered to pay Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) a
month temporary support, to allow Appellant the use of an automobile and to maintain a policy of health insurance for the
benefit of the minor children (R. 263).
On December 5, 1977, Appellant filed a Motion for Order
Compelling Further Discovery or in the alternative, for Entry of
Default Judgment (R. 46-47).

Said motion was heard on December

21, 1977 and Respondent was ordered to answer the Interrogatories
propounded by Appellant on or before January 11, 1978, or suffer
his Answer to be stricken and his default entered (R. 265 et
seq.).

On December 22, 1977, the case was set for trial on
February 7, 1978 before Judge Dee.

On January 16, 1978, Respon-
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dent's Answer was

st~icken

and his default entered (R. 53).

On

January 31, 1978, Appellant filed a Notice of Default Hearing
which hearing was to be held on February 1, 1978, before Judge
Marcellus K. Snow (R. 54).

On February 1, 1978, Respondent filed

a Motion to Vacate Default (R. 55).

As grounds for his Motion,

Respondent submitted a medical statement with his Motion stating
that he had been ill and that his illness had caused him to be
late in responding to discovery (R. 55-58).

Respondent's Answers

to Appellant's written interrogatories was filed on February 1,
1978 (R. 60-89).

On February 1, Judge Snow granted Respondent's

Motion to Set Aside Jefault (R. 59).
On Februar/- i:S, 1978, Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt withdrew as
counsel for Respondent and Jed W. Shields became counsel for
Respondent (R. 736).
By Order of Judge Dee filed March 22, 1978, Respondent
was ordered to supply more complete answers to the Interrogator·
ies of Appellant, said answers to be and were submitted by Harch
24, 1978 (R. 101).
On April 7, 1978, the divorce was granted after a
settlement reached between Appellant and Respondent was read into
the record (R. 231

et seq.).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of

Law and a Decree of Divorce were filed by Appellant's counsel on
May 19, 1978 (R. 104-121).

On June 20, 1978, a Motion and Order
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were presented by Appellant's counsel to Judge Dee which recited
that the Findings and Decree entered on May 19, 1978 were erroneously entered (R. 122-123) and new Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered on June 22,
1978 (R. 124-132).
Mr. Gary A. Sargent withdrew as counsel for the Appellant and David A. Goodwill became counsel for Appellant (R. 735).
On July 20, 1978, Appellant filed 1) a Motion for
Relief from Final Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the U.C.R.P.,
2) a Notice of Lis Pendens against the realty that had been
awarded to the Respondent, and 3) a Notice of Appeal alleging that
she had obtained material and relevant information regarding the
real property of the parties which could not have been disovered
by due diligence in time to move for new trial, that Defendant,
Milan Mack Boyce, had been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct in relation to the divorce action, and that she had
entered into the stipulation for settlement while under duress
(R. 216).

On July 27, 1978, Respondent filed a Motion to Require
Plaintiff to remove her lis pendens (R. 153).

Pursuant to a

Motion for Special Setting filed by Respondent (R. 155), the
matter was heard August 1, 1978 (R. 735 et seq.).

By Minute of

Entry of August 1, 1978, Judge Dee ordered all real property and
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cash to be restored as they were on April 7, 1978 (R. 162).
Appellant's counsel drew up an order reflecting the Court's
August l, 1978 decision.
On August 17, Mr. David A. Goodwill withdrew as counsel
for the Appellant, and Mr. R. M. Child entered his appearance as
counsel for the Appellant.
On August 21, 1978, the Respondent filed an Objection
to the Order requiring the restoration of the property and money
based on Respondent's previous irrevocable disposition of some of
the property in order to raise the necessary funds to satisfy the
demands of the Decree of Divorce imposed on the Respondent (R.
279-281).

In support of the Objection, Respondent filed his

"Petition to Set As::_de the Temporary Order of the Court and to
Restore the Decree of Divorce Herein", explaining the dispositions
of the property and the consequent impossibility of compliance
with the Order (R. 307-335).
Thereafter, a hearing on the various pending motions
was held on September 8, 1978.

At that hearing, Judge Dee

related to counsel a conversation he had with the Chief Justice
of this Court in which he was told that the filing of the Notice
of Appeal had stripped the trial court of the jurisdiction necess·
ary to make the August 1, 1978 decision (R. 773).

Judge Dee con·

sequently refused to sign the Order drawn by Appellant's counsel
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(R. 221) and Judge Dee directed Respondent's counsel to prepare
an Order vacating the August 1, 1978 decision (R. 789).

Judge

Dee also ruled the matter was open for additional discovery upon
the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal so that he would have
facts adequate to decide whether the Court should grant the Rule
60(b) motion (R. 787-788).
On September 20, 1978, Appellant's Appeal #15958 to
this court wab dismissed at Appellant's request (R. 277).
On October 5, 1978, Judge Dee signed Respondent's Order
Vacating the Order of August 1, 1978, and he concurrently initialled the Appellant's Order as not signed (R. 336-341).
On October 10, 1978, a hearing was set for October 17,
1978 (R. 342).
On October 17, 1978, a full evidentiary hearing was
held; Appellant called several witnesses, examined those witnesses
and proffered evidence in an attempt to prove the allegations of
fraud set out in her Motion.

Appellant indicated at the hearing

that she had received a sheet of paper through her attorney a few
days prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation date, which sheet of
paper contained the answers as compelled by the March 22, 1979
Order (R. 212, R. 803, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

The Court

ruled that the Appellant failed to prove the allegations of fraud
(which she admits on page 30 of her brief) (R. 527-530), after a
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full and complete opportunity to do so was afforded her (R.792891).

Appellant then filed her Notice of Appeal (R. 661).
ARGUMENT
I.

NO FRAUD WAS PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLANT BY THE
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE
SUCH AVERMENTS AND FAILED TO DO SO.
The parties in this matter entered into a stipulated
divorce.

Appellant now seeks to set aside her agreement and the

Decree entered pursuant to that agreement insisting that the
Respondent perpetrated fraud upon her by hiding and otherwise
misrepresenting

hi~

dssets, thus depriving her of the ability to

present the full extent of such assets to the Court and causing
her to enter into an unfair Property Settlement.

The trial court

correctly determined that no fraud had been perpetrated and that
the Appellant had a full and complete opportunity to present her
evidence in support of her Rule 60(b) Motion and failed to prove
her averments.

When the trial court, after hearing determines

that an Appellant failed to establish grounds justifying setting
aside a judgment, this court has ruled it should not disturb that
ruling absent of a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge.

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. , 123 U. 416, 260 P. 2d 74i

-8- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1953).

In setting out this rule, this Court declared that the

key consideration is that the parties should be given an opportunity to present their position to the Court.
420.

123 Utah at 419-

As this Court stated in Warren:
"The Rule that the Courts will incline
toward granting relief to a party who has not
had the opportunity to present his case is
ordinarily applied at the trial court level,
and this Court will not reverse the trial
court where it appears that all elements were
considered, merely because the Motion could
have been granted. The Supreme Court will
not substitute its discretion for that of the
trial court." Id., at 744.
In this case Appellant had her day in Court (two of

them, first on April 7, 1978 at the time of the stipulated settlement and again a second time on October 17, 1978) and now attempts
to retry the facts, not the law here.

That is something this

court can do but does not do on the facts because of the great
deference given to the trial court's advantage in being in close
proximity to the parties and the witnesses during the trial.
Richins v. Struhs, 17 U. 2d 356, 358, 412 P.2d 314 (1966).
This Court has considered precisely the issues presented in this matter in Haner v. Haner, 13 U. 2d 299, 373 P.2d
577 (1962) where an appeal was taken from an order denying a
Motion to Set Aside or Modify Divorce Decree.

The Hotion was

based on allegation that Respondent had introduced evidence of
fraudulent values on some of the properties which were subject to
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property settlement.

In affirming the trial court, this Court

ruled:
"In order to justify granting relief,
the alleged wrong would have to be of the
type characterized as extrinsic fraud:
that
is, fraud based on conduct or activities
outside the court proceedings themselves; and
which is designed and has the effect of
depriving the other party of the opportunity
to present his claim or defense." 13 Utah 2d
at 301.
This is not the type of fraud being pleaded in the
instant case by the Appellant.

Appellant's position is that the

Respondent deliberately understated and denied ownership of
certain properties in his answers to interrogatories and affidavits (see Appellant's Brief, "Statement of Facts"), all of
which could have been or were presented to the Court at the time
of the April 7, 1978 stipulation and could have been challenged
by the Appellant in the Court proceedings.

In fact, they were

subject to just such scrutiny in the hearing held October 17,
1978.

This Court stated in Haner in regard to this type of

appeal:
"It is obvious that quite a different
situation exists where there is no prevention
of the party from contesting the issues in a
trial, and where the complaint is simply that
one party presented perjured testimony or
false evidence.
This charge is simply a
continuation of the same dispute which the
trial was supposed to resolve.
It is the
purpose of the law to afford parties full
opportunity to have themselves and their

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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witnesses present; and to present their
evidence and their contentions to the Court.
When this has been done and the Court has
made its determination, that should end the
matter, except for the right of appeal. It
is so patent as to hardly justify comment
that a judgment should not be set aside
merely to grant the losing party another
chance to accomplish the task at which he
just failed; to prove that he was right and
that the opponent was wrong. To reopen a
case just because a party persists in asserting and attempting to prove that his version
of the dispute was the truth and that of the
opponent was false would open the door to a
repetition of that procedure, whoever won the
next time; and thus to keeping the dispute
going ad infinitum with no way of determining
when the merry-go-round of the law suit would
end. This would involve not only a waste of
time, energy, and expense but also would
result in such uncertainty as to people's
rights that the very purpose of a law suit,
the settling of disputes and putting them at
rest, would be defeated. Resort to the
Courts would be frustrating and impracticable
unless there were some point at which decisions
became final so that parties could place
reliance thereon, leave their troubles behind
and proceed to the future. It is for these
reasons that Courts accord to judgments
regularly entered a high degree of sanctity;
and would overturn a judgment such as the
instant one on the ground of fraud only if it
were shown that the complaining party had
been wrongfully deprived of the opportunity
to meet and contest the issues at trial." 13
Utah 2d at 301-302.
The Appellant had her day in Court, in which she had a
full opportunity to present evidence to support her accusations
of fraud.

She simply failed to prove those accusations.

She

asserts that the trial court made its decision based on affidavits
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rather than testimony but that is not true.

From the record it

is obvious Judge Dee did not rely on the Respondent's Affidavit
in reaching his decision because at the end of the October 17,
1978, fraud hearing he indicated that he already had a feeling
for whether or not the Appellant had met her burden of proof in
the matter, based on the testimony presented at the hearing (R.
887-888).

She had the opportunity to present evidence on October

17, 1978 and simply failed to prove her case.

She now seeks to

try it one more time before this Court.
It is interesting to note that the Appellant in her
brief admits that she failed to meet her burden of proof:
"The October 17 Hearing was not intended
to, and it did not, amount to formal proof of
common law frau~ (emphasis added) (page
30).

Respondent is in full agreement with the Appellant that the
hearing did not result in proof of fraud, but the Appellant is
gravely mistaken if she is under the impression that the October
17, 1978 hearing was not intended as evidentiary in character,
fully intended to allow her a full opportunity to prove the
averments of her Motion.

Judge Dee, during the hearing which

preceded the October 17, 1978 hearing, characterized that hearing
as a full evidentiary hearing (R. 779) and put Appellant on
notice that the October 17, 1978 hearing was indeed the occasion
to present proof of her allegations of fraud (R. 779 et seq.).
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Appellant also takes the position that Judge Dee "gave
the impression" at the September 8, 1978 hearing that Appellant
could not proceed with any discovery prior to the October 17,
1978 hearing.

Appellant attempts to persuade this Court that

such was the case by including selected portions of the record of
the September 8, 1978 hearing in the appendix to her brief,
evidently to excuse her failure to prove her allegations of
fraud.

If Appellant would have read the remainder of the record

of the September 8, 1978 hearing, she would have discovered that
Judge Dee took quite the opposite position:
"THE COURT: .
but if there is an
indication that at the time the Decree was
entered the person who entered into a Stipulation on the basis of which the Decree was
issued was acting under a mistake of fact or
surprise or with some kind of excusable
neglect or there was some misrepresentation
or fraud, the Court will exercise jurisdiction
as a Court of equity, to look into those
problems. And the only way I am going to
get information which will be a basis on
which I can decide whether or not the Court
has made a mistake in entering that Decree is
to allow the defendant and the plaintiff
broad opportunities to take what other steps
the need to take to im lement their discover
Depositions, emand or production o
ocuments,
whatever you need to take, whatever steps you
need to take in order that the Court can
properly have all of the facts.

* ** ** * ** * *
And now I'm opening it~ for the
purpose of;giving you gentlemen the opportunity
to advise me as to what property is involved
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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and how it should be divided, and that's got
to be the way to go.
(emphasis added).
R.787-788.
The above-quoted statement of the Court shows not only
did the Court not "give the impression" that discovery was
blocked, Judge Dee directly stated the opposite.

How Appellant

arrived at the "impression" that discovery was blocked by the
Court is a virtual mystery to the Respondent.
A reading of the record will also reveal that all of
the issues which the Appellant raises in relation to her allegations of fraud were "tried or triable" in the lower court
proceedings in the fashion contemplated under the authority of
Haner v. Haner, supra.
each property

For the purposes of clarity of explanation

alleged:.~; ?'.lt

out of Appellant's reach by the

alleged fraud will be listed and responded to respectively:
1.

The Transfer of the Corporations to Mr. and Mrs.

Milan C. Boyce, Respondent's Parents:

Appellant alleges that the

Respondent transferred certain corporations which he allegedly
"owned" to his parents without her knowledge, causing her to
enter into a stipulation awarding her less than that to which she
was entitled.
Mrs. Boyce, the Appellant, was in fact fully apprised
of the ownership or lack thereof in said corporations (R. 821825).

She was aware of the financial statement submitted by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent to Zions First National Bank and Respondent's Answers
to Interrogatories, which were submitted to Appellant prior to the
April 7, 1978 Stipulation (R. 60-89).

In paragraph twelve (12)

of her Affidavit of January 22, 1979, entitled "Affidavit of Nina
Doreen Davis Boyce In Response to Defendant's Answer and Counter
Affidavit", Appellant states that she knew of the transfer of the
corporations prior to the April 7, 1978 hearing wherein the
stipulation was entered (R. 571-584).
Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to
try, contest, and offer proof regarding the alleged fraud involved
in the corporate transfers

(R. 829 et seq.).

Since no fraud

occurred, she was unable to prove any.
"Fraud" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth
Edition, as "concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he
should act upon it to his legal injury."

In light of the fact

that Appellant admitted under oath that she was fully apprised of
the transfers, no claim of fraud can be based on these acts.
2.

Respondent's Statement of Value Regarding the

Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision Property:

Appellant alleges that

the Respondent defrauded her by presenting a certified MAl
appraisal stating the value of the Dimple Dell Oaks property as
Forty Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($46,500) when in fact it
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was worth in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,0:
(R. 255

See also R. 66).
To say that the Respondent attempted to defraud the

Appellant in the fashion alleged shows an absolute and total
disregard of the record.

In the September 27, 1977 hearing,

Respondent himself stated under oath that the property was worth,
in his opinion, in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars

($150,000) (R. 255 and R. 66).

Further, in a financial statement

given to Appellant in response to interrogatories, Respondent
valued the Dimple Dell property at $175,000.00

(R. 79).

The Forty Six Thousand Five Hundred ($46,500) Dollar
figure was a net val.::.1e figure that was calculated by a certified
appraiser.

See rlau,uff's Exhibit 4.

Apparently, Appellant is

not able to distinguish between market value and net value/equity
after required improvements, a critical distinction when the net
asset value of real property is in question.

Respondent's state·

ments of the market value of the property were entered into the
record prior to the April 7, 1978 Stipulation and thus served to
inform Appellant of Respondent's perception of the value of the
property.

Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to

try, contest, and offer proof of this allegation, her evidence
failed and the Trial Court correctly rejected her claim (R. 255
et seq. R. 841 et seq.)
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3.

Parties Residence at Top of the World Drive.

Prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation, the parties sold this
property in a bona fide sale to an unrelated third party for One
Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars (R. 443), which fairly and
accurately established the fair market value of this property.
This sale established that Appellant's claims regarding any other
representation of value is without merit.

If other evidence

existed it has not been presented by Appellant.
4.
Inc.

Liens in Favor of American Concrete Construction,

Appellant knew of said liens prior to the April 7, 1978

stipulation (R. 66).
the Appellant.

Said liens did not evaporate as claimed by

The liens for labor and materials were (after the

stipulation of April 7, 1978) traded for land the Respondent was
awarded in the settlement.

The Appellant was informed of this

prior to the October 17, 1978 hearing (R. 328-329).

Since there

was no fraud involved, Appellant failed to prove it occurred.
5.

The Higher Valuation Placed on the 1295 East

4800 South Property.

Appellant alleges as fraud the fact that

the Respondent's family gave a higher value for this property in
the Lockhart financial statement of May l, 1978 than Respondent
had previously given prior to the stipulation.

This is true

but the higher valuation was given because of a zoning change and
sale of a neighbors property after the zoning change caused a
rise in the value of that similar property.

Even the application
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(R. 439) for the said zoning change was not filed by the neighbor·
ing owner until after the April 7th 1978 stipulation.

The zoning

change and its subsequent windfall to the Respondent's family
was completely beyond the Respondent's control and certainly
nothing the Respondent knew of or withheld from the Appellant
who was as able as was the Respondent or his family to learn of
these events (R. 435-440
6.

See also R. 316-318).

Sale of the Red, Inc. Partnership Interest in the

Highland Drive Property to May V. Boen:

In answer to Appellant's

Interrogatories, Respondent described the complete status of this
property to the Appellant prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation
(R. 212

See also B E7

Appellant later tried to contend that

Respondent fraudulently transferred the interest in this property
allegedly purchased by the Respondent (in his capacity as President of Insul-Guard Corporation) and a Dr. Tarbet.

May V. Boen

testified that this was a bona fide purchase and sale between
herself and the Insul-Guard Corporation (R. 883-884) .

She made

the purchase with her own money (contrary to Appellant's assertions).
Appellant did not prove any attempts by the Respondent
to conceal the sale from the Appellant (R. 861 et seq.).

In fact

Dr. Tarbet testified that the transactions were discussed with
the Appelant

(R. 851).
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Thus Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity
to contest, try and offer proof of the allegation of fraud in
this respect and her evidence did not support her assertion.
7.
l, 1978:

The Lockhart Company Financial Statement of May

Appellant alleges that the Respondent represented at

the lower court proceedings that he had no interest in the corporations heretofore described (due to the transfer of the same
to his parents).

But asserted that after those proceedings, he

applied for a loan at The Lockhart Company telling them in his
consolidated family financial statement that he owned the corporations.

Appellant asserts this as evidence of fraudulent

concealment.
Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to
try, contest, and offer proof of this allegation.

Respondent

contended and does now contend that the assets listed on the
Lockhart financial statement were family assets, not personal
assets.

This was discussed with and understood by the Lockhart

Company's loan officer, Thomas G. Pike.

Mr. Pike testified that

there had been a discussion of family assets being pledged as
security for the loan (R. 841).

The heading on one of the pages

of the financial statement plainly states that the assets thereon
belong to the Respondent's Aunt, May V. Boen (R. 208 and plaintiff's Exhibit 8) and there is in the statement a summary page
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showing the summary of family assets being consolidated into the
statement (R. 204 and plaintiff's Exhibit 8).
Further this Lockhart financial statement was exactly
the same kind of consolidated family financial statement (even as
to layout and format) as was given to the Appellant in answers to
interrogatories before the April 7, 1978 stipulation (R. 78-89)
and Defendant's Exhibit 7).

The Trial Court correctly concluded

that Appellant had ample opportunity to examine all of this
information and this being true she had failed to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that there was any fraud involved (R.
837 et seq.).
In sum

tiie <"<ppellant' s contentions are defeated by the

record as it existed prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation.
The Appellant was given every opportunity to conduct discovery
and present her evidence to the trial court.
failed to prove her contentions.

She did so and

She is now attempting to retry

the case in this Court in order to have a third chance to succeed
in proving what she twice failed to prove at the trial court
level.

This is contrary to this Court's position regarding

appeals of this nature.

It should be treated accordingly

and this Court should affirm Judge Dee's ruling.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO APPELLANT TO REMOVE THE LIS
PENDENS IS A MOOT ISSUE UPON APPEAL.
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Courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants before them.
of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

Doremus v. Board

The Courts do not sit to

decide arguments after events have put them to rest.

North

Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, (1971).
The lis pendens issue raised by the Appellant is such
an issue.

If, arguendo, Judge Dee's decision is reversed and

remanded, the lis pendens would not need be removed since a trial
de novo would be set.

If Judge Dee is sustained, his Order would

stand and the lis pendens must be removed as the litigation would
be terminated.
A decision of this Court on the issue of the lis
pendens would not affect any of the rights of the parties and is
a false issue which should be disregarded.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, represented by able counsel, had her day in
court.

Now after the demands have been met, she seeks vacation

of the Decree which awarded $100,000.00 cash and other valuable
assets to her.

She wants more but the trial court denied Appel-

lant's motions to set aside her own agreement and the Order based
thereon after giving her a full and fair opportunity to show she
had been defrauded.

This Court should affirm that ruling.
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Respectfully submitted,

243~ast Fourth South
®:tte 300, Upper Level
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
:t:?II?ICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered copies
of the foregoing Respondent Is Brief' on this rs'"'-f:'

day of

July, 1979, to the following:
R. M. Child, Esq.
DONOVAN C. SNYDER, Esq.
Bayle, Child & Ritchie
1105 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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